William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 30 | Issue 2

Article 4

2003

Unlawful Discrimination or a Necessity for a Fair
Trial?: Exclusion of a Law Clerk with a Disability
from the Courtroom During Jury Trial of a
Personal Injury Case
Luther A. Granquist

Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Disability Law Commons, Labor and
Employment Law Commons, and the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons
Recommended Citation
Granquist, Luther A. (2003) "Unlawful Discrimination or a Necessity for a Fair Trial?: Exclusion of a Law Clerk with a Disability from
the Courtroom During Jury Trial of a Personal Injury Case," William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 30: Iss. 2, Article 4.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law

Granquist: Unlawful Discrimination or a Necessity for a Fair Trial?: Exclusi
4 GRANQUIST - PAGINATED.DOC

12/8/2003 2:50 PM

UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION OR A NECESSITY FOR A
FAIR TRIAL?: EXCLUSION OF A LAW CLERK WITH A
DISABILITY FROM THE COURTROOM DURING JURY
TRIAL OF A PERSONAL INJURY CASE
Luther A. Granquist†
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................... 455
II. DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF DISABILITY WITH
REGARD TO THE TERMS, CONDITIONS, OR PRIVILEGES OF
EMPLOYMENT IS PROHIBITED BY STATE AND FEDERAL LAW... 460
A. Would an Order Prohibiting a Law Clerk with a
Disability from Working in the Courtroom Be an
Adverse Employment Action?............................................ 464
B. Would There Be Justification for the Discriminatory
Action? .............................................................................. 467
III. THE INTERESTS AND RIGHTS OF THE INJURED PLAINTIFF ......... 468
A. The Plaintiff’s Interest and Right Is to Have a Fair Trial. 468
B. Basis in Law and Fact to Exclude Injured Plaintiffs from
the Courtroom During a Jury Trial................................... 469
IV. THE OBLIGATION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE TO PROTECT THE
INTERESTS OF BOTH THE LAW CLERK WITH A DISABILITY
AND THE INJURED PLAINTIFF. .................................................... 478
V. CONCLUSION .............................................................................. 483
I. INTRODUCTION
In a personal injury case in a Minnesota trial court in March 2000,
the plaintiff’s lawyer moved for a mistrial on the basis that the judge’s
law clerk, a man with severe disabilities, had worked in the courtroom in
1
the presence of the jury. The attorney stated that the jury’s comparison
† Luther Granquist is a Staff Attorney at the Minnesota Disability Law Center.
1. In re Charges of Unprofessional Conduct Contained in Panel Case No. 15976,
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of the law clerk with his client would diminish his chances of a
2
3
recovery. The trial judge denied the motion. After the jury found for
the defendant on the issue of liability, the judge also denied a motion for
4
a new trial brought, in part, on the same basis. Subsequently, the trial
judge reported what he deemed to be plaintiff counsel’s unprofessional
conduct to the Minnesota Office of Lawyers Professional
5
Responsibility. Ultimately, in In re Charges of Unprofessional Conduct
Contained in Panel Case No. 15976, the Minnesota Supreme Court
upheld a determination by a panel of the Minnesota Lawyers
Professional Responsibility Board that the attorney had violated Rule
8.4(d) of the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct (engaging in
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice) by bringing the post6
trial motion on those grounds.
In 1999, in In re Charges of Unprofessional Conduct Contained in
Panel File 98-26, the court had held that a prosecutor violated Rule
8.4(d) by bringing a motion to prohibit an African-American public
defender from being co-counsel for an African-American man charged
7
with robbery of a Caucasian couple. The Panel Case No. 15976 court
extended this holding—that race can never be used as a basis for limiting
an attorney’s participation in a court proceeding—to “encompass
situations where disability is used to limit a court employee’s
8
participation in a court proceeding.”
The court observed that the
9
Minnesota Human Rights Act (“MHRA”) prohibits discrimination in
653 N.W.2d 452, 454 (Minn. 2002) [hereinafter Panel Case No. 15976]. In this case, the
Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility referred the complaint to a
District Ethics Committee for investigation. Id. at 455. Based upon that investigation, the
director issued an admonition based on the conclusion that both the initial and post-trial
motions constituted unprofessional conduct in violation of Rule 3.1 (frivolous motions)
and Rule 8.4(d) (prejudicial conduct) of the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct. Id.
See also MINN. R. PROF. CONDUCT 3.1, 8.4(d) (2002). The attorney exercised his right to
have this decision reviewed by a panel of the Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board.
Panel Case No. 15976, 653 N.W.2d at 455. After a hearing, that panel amended the
admonition by limiting it solely to the post-trial motion. Id. Both the trial judge and the
attorney sought discretionary review of the determination; the Minnesota Supreme Court
granted review and consolidated the two cases. Id. at 454.
2. Panel Case No. 15976, 653 N.W.2d at 454.
3. Id. at 455.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 457.
7. In re Charges of Unprofessional Conduct Contained in Panel File 98-26, 597
N.W.2d 563 (Minn. 1999) [hereinafter Panel File 98-26].
8. Panel Case No. 15976, 653 N.W.2d at 456.
9. MINN. STAT. §§ 363.01-20 (2002).
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employment, housing, and other areas on the basis of disability as well as
10
Because Minnesota treats race-based and
on the basis of race.
11
disability-based discrimination equally under the MHRA, the court
concluded that the determination that the plaintiff’s attorney violated
12
Rule 8.4(d) was not “clearly erroneous.”
In both this case and the previous case involving race
13
discrimination, the Lawyers Board Panel issued a private admonition.
Whether that action is by the director of the Office, by a Lawyers Board
Panel when an attorney requests review of that action (as in the present
case), or after the director submits the issue to a Lawyers Board Panel for
hearing, a private admonition may be issued only if the lawyer’s
14
unprofessional conduct is of an “isolated and non-serious nature.” In
the race discrimination case, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the
private admonition given by the panel on the basis that race-based
15
misconduct was inherently serious. The court, however, exercised its
prerogative to determine what disciplinary action was appropriate.
Because the prosecutor demonstrated remorse, lacked malicious intent,
16
and took remedial actions, the court issued a private admonition.
In
10. Panel Case No. 15976, 653 N.W.2d at 456-57.
11. See MINN. STAT. § 363.12 (2002) (stating the policy of the MHRA).
12. Id. at 458. The Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board Panel had also
found that the post-trial motion violated Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct 3.1,
which prohibits a lawyer from bringing a motion “unless there is a basis for doing so that
is not frivolous” or “which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification
or reversal of existing law.” Id. The supreme court noted that the panel relied on the fact
that the attorney failed to support his position with legal authority. Id. at 457. (The
parties to the disciplinary proceeding, the Panel of the Lawyers Board, the court and the
amici in the supreme court, all failed to find any other case involving comparable
circumstances, whether involving disciplinary action or not.) The court expressed
concern that overzealous application of Rule 3.1 could inhibit attorneys from bringing
issues of first impression, but did not reach the issue because of the determination that the
attorney’s conduct violated Rule 8.4(d). Id.
13. Panel Case No. 15976, 653 N.W.2d at 455; Panel File 98-26, 597 N.W.2d at
567.
14. An admonition may be issued “if the Director concludes that a lawyer’s conduct
was unprofessional but of an isolated and non-serious nature . . . .” MINN. R. PROF.
CONDUCT 8(d)(2) (2002). In this case, the panel issued an Amended Admonition
pursuant to this rule provision. After a hearing on disciplinary charges, an admonition
may be issued only if the unprofessional conduct is of an “isolated and non-serious
nature . . . .” MINN. R. PROF. CONDUCT 9(j)(iii) (2002).
15. Panel File 98-26, 597 N.W.2d at 568.
16. Id. at 568-69. The court noted “with favor the sincerity of respondent’s remorse
after she recognized her misconduct.” Id. at 568. The court stated:
The record in the present case also indicates that once respondent realized the
impropriety of her motion, she took immediate action to mitigate the
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Panel Case No. 15976, the court reviewed the circumstances of the
earlier case and stated that there they had “unequivocally held that race17
based misconduct is inherently serious.”
Nevertheless, when faced
with disability-based misconduct the court concluded “that the Panel did
not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably by finding that
18
respondent’s conduct in this particular situation was non-serious.” The
court based this ruling, at least in part, on the fact the prosecutor in In re
Panel File 98-26 misused the power of the state by interfering with a
19
defendant’s right to counsel.
By contrast, the court stated, the
plaintiff’s attorney “did not exercise any authority or control over the
20
disabled clerk.” Thus, the court reasoned, “[a]ny discriminatory effect
21
from the motion was indirect . . . .”
Unprofessional conduct by an attorney representing the state is
indeed serious. But in both cases, the actual discriminatory effect of
preventing a criminal defendant from being represented by the counsel of
his choice or by altering the customary practice of assigning a law clerk’s
responsibilities could only be achieved by asking the court to be the
instrument of discrimination. From that perspective, the actions of both
attorneys were alike; the court prefaced this explanation of its holding
consequences of her misconduct . . . . Since the incident, respondent has
repeatedly expressed remorse over her actions, has apologized and has
vowed that such a lapse of judgment will not happen again, and, to that end,
has taken precautions to ensure that her error is not repeated.
Id. at 569.
17. Panel Case No. 15976, 653 N.W. 2d at 456.
18. Id. at 458. The court also held that the conduct was “isolated,” for only two
arguments were made on the same issue during the same trial and there were no other
instances of misconduct. Id. at 457. Elsewhere in the decision, but not in the discussion
of the appropriate discipline, the court noted that the plaintiff’s attorney stated when he
made the motion that he brought it with “great reluctance” and “acknowledged that the
motion was ‘outrageous and distasteful for the [c]ourt.’ ” Id. at 454. The court also
noted the attorney’s statements and testimony at the hearing:
Addressing his reasons for bringing the motion for a mistrial respondent
stated, “I was thinking of fairness and I was thinking of my client and his
wishes with respect to at least raising the issue to the judge.” He also
asserted that his duty to ensure his client received a fair trial overrode his
reluctance to bring the motion. Finally, he stated that he would not have
made the objection in a case that did not involve disability issues that might
lead to similar comparisons.
Id. at 455. The court stated without further comment in the review of the procedural
posture of the case that the attorney had sought review of the initial private admonition
by the director. Id. at 454.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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that the misconduct involved was “non-serious” with a longer discussion
that focused on a perceived tension between the rights of two persons
22
with disabilities, the injured plaintiff and the law clerk.
After
acknowledging that the law clerk with a disability had a right to perform
his job in the courtroom, the court stated:
But here we have the perceived rights of two disabled persons
potentially in conflict with one another . . . . Respondent’s
client was concerned that the jury would compare the law
clerk’s more severe disability with his less severe disability
and that comparison would unduly influence the jury to decide
against him on his claims and deprive him of a fair trial.
Ironically, the concern of respondent’s client, as argued by
respondent, was not that the law clerk’s disability prevented
him from capably performing his job, but that the law clerk’s
demonstrated capability would diminish the client’s disability
claim. Respondent’s motion can be viewed as an inappropriate
attempt to address the respective rights of two disabled
persons, rather than elevating the rights of one over the rights
of another. If respondent was concerned that the jury might
make improper comparisons, respondent could have addressed
those concerns during voir dire. Nonetheless, when viewed in
context, we conclude that the Panel did not act arbitrarily,
capriciously or unreasonably by finding that respondent’s
23
conduct in this particular situation was non-serious.
There is a vast difference between stating “unequivocally” that race24
based misconduct is “inherently serious,” and viewing the motion to
bar a law clerk with a disability from the courtroom as “an inappropriate
attempt to address the respective rights of two disabled persons, rather
25
than elevating the rights of one over the rights of the other.”
The
court’s analysis comes perilously close to asserting that discrimination
on the basis of disability is more permissible if done by or on behalf of a
26
person with a disability.
The court’s statements imply that
discrimination on the basis of disability by an officer of the court is less
27
serious than discrimination on the basis of race. The court’s statements
22. Panel Case No. 15976, 653 N.W.2d at 457-58.
23. Id.
24. Panel File 98-26, 597 N.W.2d at 567.
25. Panel Case No. 15976, 653 N.W.2d at 456.
26. See id. at 457-58 (responding to complainant’s assertion that a more serious
sanction is warranted, the court stated that here the issue involved the perceived rights of
two disabled persons potentially in conflict with one another).
27. See id. (discussing statutory objections to end race-based discrimination and
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also suggest that it was not unreasonable for the attorney to bring the
28
motions that he did, at least the initial motion.
Nevertheless, the court did characterize the motion as
29
“inappropriate.” The court’s decision assumes, without stating, that it
30
was appropriately denied. What the court does not do is analyze the
tension between the “perceived rights of two disabled persons potentially
31
in conflict with one another.”
That analysis would include a more
detailed discussion of the law clerk’s employment rights, the plaintiff’s
right to a fair trial, and the trial court’s obligation to ensure a fair trial
and yet refrain from discriminating against the law clerk on the basis of
disability.
II. DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF DISABILITY WITH REGARD
TO THE TERMS, CONDITIONS, OR PRIVILEGES OF EMPLOYMENT
IS PROHIBITED BY STATE AND FEDERAL LAW
The Minnesota Supreme Court stated that a “disabled court
32
employee has a right to perform his job in the courtroom.” Both state
33
The
and federal law appear to support this unqualified statement.
MHRA states that it is an unfair employment practice to discriminate on
the basis of disability “with respect to hiring, tenure, compensation,
34
terms, upgrading, conditions, facilities, or privileges of employment.”
For a law clerk, the opportunity to work in the courtroom seems to be
included within the “terms,” “conditions,” or “privileges” of
35
employment. The trial judge testified at the disciplinary hearing that
his two law clerks divided the responsibility of assisting the judge on
36
cases. In addition to preparing memoranda addressing the issues in a
case, the trial judge assigned each of his law clerks to communicate with
respondent’s objective in bringing the motion, which is distinguishable from race-based
discrimination in In re Panel File 98-26).
28. See id. at 458 (stating that an discriminatory effect from the motion was
indirect).
29. Id.
30. See id. (noting respondent could have addressed any concerns during voir dire).
31. Id. at 457.
32. Id.
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2003); MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 1(2)(c) (2002).
34. MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 1(2)(c).
35. Id.
36. Complainant’s Brief and Appendix, app. at 43, Panel Case No. 15976, 653
N.W.2d 452 (Minn. 2002) (Nos. C6-02-139 and C3-02-227) [hereinafter Complainant’s
Brief]; Record at 14-18, Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board (No. 15976)
[hereinafter Record].
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the jury panel, to seat jury members for voir dire, to administer oaths,
and to be available to the judge to respond to questions of law that arose
37
during a trial. The plaintiff’s motion sought an order from the court
that would remove the clerk from the courtroom and change the
customary practice, the judge’s law clerks working in the courtroom
38
during trials, solely because of his disability. Given the broad scope of
the unfair discriminatory practices in the statute, the reasonable
conclusion seems that the law clerk would suffer discrimination
39
actionable under the MHRA if the court were to grant the motion.
The same result would appear to follow from the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Title I of the ADA proscribes discrimination
on the basis of disability in employment by specified classes of
40
employers, which include states. The statute covers a similarly broad
range of employment actions by requiring that “[n]o covered entity shall
discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of
the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures,
the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
41
employment.”
The statute defines “discriminate” in broad terms to
include “limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant or employee
in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or status of such
applicant or employee because of the disability of such applicant or
42
employee.”
The basic rule in subsection (a) is as broad as the
Minnesota statute. The gloss on “discriminate” in subsection (b) is even
broader. A law clerk banished from the courtroom because of his
disability is limited in his work and segregated. Subsection (b) also
states that the term “discriminate” in subsection (a) “includes” the three
43
44
specified actions.
This language in the ADA appears to establish
37. Complainant’s Brief, supra note 36, at app. 41, 43-44.
38. See id. at 41-44.
39. See MINN. STAT. § 363.03 (2002).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2), (5), and (7) (2003).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2003).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1).
43. Id.
44. The United States Supreme Court has held that Congress did not validly
abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity for purposes of damages actions
based on Title I of the ADA. Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 n.9 (2001).
However, Title I of the ADA is applicable in this case, which involves the potential
discriminatory effect of an order of a state court judge. The Supreme Court noted that
“Title I of the ADA still prescribes standards applicable to the States” and that actions
against public officials for prospective injunctive relief were still available. Id. The
Court specifically stated:
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what the Panel 15976 court stated, that the law clerk had a right to
45
perform his job in the courtroom.
Another federal statute, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,
outlaws discrimination on the basis of a person’s disability in programs
46
that receive federal financial assistance.
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the
United States, as defined in section 705(20) of this title, shall,
solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted
by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal
47
Service.
Section 504 would apply to the court’s action if the court system receives
48
federal financial assistance. Assuming this federal financial assistance,
a directive that a law clerk with a disability be excluded from the
courtroom because of that disability would certainly appear to subject
49
that law clerk to discrimination in terms of section 504.
The law clerk’s employment rights are also protected by Title II of
the ADA, which proscribes discrimination on the basis of disability in
public services by stating “no qualified individual with a disability shall,
Our holding here that Congress did not validly abrogate the States’ sovereign
immunity from suit by private individuals for money damages under Title I
does not mean that persons with disabilities have no federal recourse against
discrimination. Title I of the ADA still prescribes standards applicable to the
States. Those standards can be enforced by the United States in actions for
money damages, as well as by private individuals in actions for injunctive
relief under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). In addition, state laws
protecting the rights of persons with disabilities in employment and other
aspects of life provide independent avenues of redress.
Id. at 374 n.9. Based upon this footnote in the Garrett decision, the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals, in Gibson v. Arkansas Department of Correction, 265 F.3d 718, 719-20
(2001), held that state officials can be sued in their official capacity for injunctive relief
under Title I of the ADA by using Ex parte Young.
45. Panel Case No. 15976, 653 N.W.2d at 457.
46. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2003).
47. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
48. See id. Unlike the ADA, an action effectively against the state under section
504 is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d
1079, 1082 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that statutory abrogation of states’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity from suit under Rehabilitation Act, where the state received
federal funds, was a proper exercise of Congress’ spending power). Congress enacted
section 504 under the Spending Power Clause of the Constitution. Id. The state, by
accepting the federal largesse, waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id.
49. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2003).
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by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be
denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public
50
entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” The Title
II regulations prohibit discrimination by public entities in employment
51
but incorporate the Title I standards. The analysis of the law clerk’s
employment rights would be the same. Title II cases also involve
52
physical access to a courthouse or a courtroom. While serving as a law
clerk in the state district court, the law clerk in this case had physical
53
access to the courthouse and the courtroom.
Of course, to prevail in any claim of discrimination the law clerk
would have to establish that he is a “qualified individual with a
54
55
disability.” It is undisputed that the law clerk had a severe disability

50. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2003).
51. 28 C.F.R. § 35.140 (2002), provides:
(a) No qualified individual with a disability shall, on the basis of disability,
be subjected to discrimination in employment under any service, program, or
activity conducted by a public entity.
(b)(1) For purposes of this part, the requirements of title I of the Act, as
established by the regulations of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission in 29 CFR part 1630, apply to employment in any service,
program, or activity conducted by a public entity if that public entity is also
subject to the jurisdiction of title I. (2) For the purposes of this part, the
requirements of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as established
by the regulations of the Department of Justice in 28 CFR part 41, as those
requirements pertain to employment, apply to employment in any service,
program, or activity conducted by a public entity if that public entity is not
also subject to the jurisdiction of title I.
But see Filush v. Town of Weston, 266 F. Supp. 2d 322, 330-31 (D. Conn. 2003)
(deeming 28 C.F.R. § 35.140 invalid because Congress did not intend for Title II to apply
to employment).
52. Shotz v. Cates, 256 F.3d 1077 (11th Cir. 2001); Keith v. Mullins, 162 F.3d 539
(8th Cir. 1998); Layton v. Elder, 143 F.3d 469 (8th Cir. 1998). The question whether
Congress lawfully abrogated the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity in Title II cases
is currently before the Supreme Court. Tennessee v. Lane, 315 F.3d 680 (6th Cir. 2003),
cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 2622 (2003).
53. He did not, however, have ready access to the supreme court chambers in the
State Capitol to attend the argument in Panel Case No. 15976. His attendant had to
retrieve portable ramps from his van in order to get up the two marble steps that blocked
his way. (Personal knowledge of the author.)
54. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2003).
55. Panel Case No. 15976, 653 N.W.2d at 454. The court described him in these
terms, “The clerk assigned by complainant to assist in this case is physically disabled. He
is paralyzed from his mouth down and has difficulty breathing and speaking. He
performed his duties as a law clerk with the assistance of a large wheelchair, respirator
and full-time attendant.” Id.
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and was, therefore, a “qualified individual with a disability.” The trial
57
The court
judge testified that the law clerk was extremely capable.
noted that the basis for the plaintiff’s motion was that “the law clerk’s
58
demonstrated capability would diminish the client’s disability claim.”
The case for stating that an order barring the law clerk with a
disability from the courtroom violates all of these statutes seems clear.
That order would directly affect a qualified individual with a disability in
the performance of the usual functions of his job solely because of that
person’s disability. If a law clerk in this situation were actually to sue,
however, there is a serious question whether the courts would find that
an order excluding the law clerk would violate these statutes.
A. Would an Order Prohibiting a Law Clerk with a Disability from
Working in the Courtroom Be an Adverse Employment Action?
The courts are often reluctant to find that actions by employers short
of termination or reduction of pay or benefits fulfill the “adverse
employment action” component of a prima facie case of employment
59
discrimination, despite the broad language in both the MHRA and the
60
61
ADA regarding terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals limits these terms severely in
62
actions under both the ADA and Title VII. The general standard is that
56. The ADA defines a “qualified individual with a disability” as:
[A]n individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment
position that such individual holds or desires. For the purposes of this
subchapter, consideration shall be given to the employer’s judgment as to
what functions of a job are essential, and if an employer has prepared a
written description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job,
this description shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the
job.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2003).
57. Complainant’s Brief, supra note 36, at app. 42; Record, supra note 36, at 17.
58. Panel Case No. 15976, 653 N.W.2d at 458.
59. MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 1(2)(c) (2002).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2003).
61. Cooney v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 258 F.3d 731, 734 (8th Cir. 2001) (“To
establish a prima facie treatment case . . . appellants had to show that they suffered an
adverse employment action.”); Spears v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr. & Human Res., 210 F.3d
850, 853-54 (8th Cir. 2000).
62. See, e.g., Burchett v. Target Corp., 340 F.3d 510, 518 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding
that failure to transfer disabled employee to a different department was not in violation of
MHRA or ADA); Moisant v. Air Midwest, Inc., 291 F.3d 1028, 1031 (8th Cir. 2002);
Manning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 1997).
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the plaintiff must show a “tangible change in duties or working
63
conditions that constituted a material employment disadvantage.”
Phrased differently, there must not simply be a change in the terms or
64
conditions of employment, but a material change.
In rather cavalier
fashion, the courts state that “[n]ot everything that makes an employee
65
unhappy is an actionable adverse employment action.”
Rather,
“[t]ermination, reduction in pay or benefits, and changes in employment
that significantly affect an employee’s future career prospects meet this
66
standard.” Adverse employment evaluations that have no direct impact
67
on employment status are not actionable. Mere “inconvenience” is not
68
Lateral transfers that do not involve loss of pay, benefits,
enough.
69
rank, or responsibility are not adverse employment actions. The Eighth
Circuit has held that employer actions requiring an employee to move
70
71
from Omaha to Denison, Iowa, or from St. Paul to Chicago are not
72
adverse employment actions in retaliation cases.
In Ledergerber v.
63. Burchett, 340 F.3d at 518 (quoting Moisant, 291 F.3d at 1031); see also Spears,
210 F.3d at 854 (finding that the lowering of an officer’s performance evaluation was not
an “adverse employment action”).
64. Jones v. Reliant Energy—ARKLA, 336 F.3d 689, 691 (8th Cir. 2003) (race
discrimination under Title VII); Fenney v. Dakota, Minn. & R.R. Co., 327 F.3d 707, 71617 (8th Cir. 2003) (ADA and MHRA); Brown v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 286 F.3d
1040, 1045 (8th Cir. 2002) (ADA).
65. LaCroix v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 240 F.3d 688, 691 (8th Cir. 2001) (sex
discrimination and retaliation under Title VII); see also Brown, 286 F.3d at 1045.
66. Jones, 336 F.3d at 691 (quoting Spears, 210 F.3d at 853).
67. Burchett, 340 F.3d at 518-19; see also LaCroix, 240 F.3d at 691-92 (finding
moderately negative performance review to be insufficiently adverse).
68. Spears, 210 F.3d at 853 (retaliation under Title VII); accord Enowmbitang v.
Seagate Tech., Inc., 148 F.3d 970, 973 (8th Cir. 1998) (race and national origin
discrimination under Title VII and MHRA).
69. Fenney, 327 F.3d at 717; Brown, 286 F.3d at 1045; LePique v. Hove, 217 F.3d
1012, 1013-14 (8th Cir. 2000) (sexual harassment under Title VII).
70. Montandon v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 116 F.3d 355, 359 (8th Cir. 1997).
71. Hoffman v. Rubin, 193 F.3d 959, 964 (8th Cir. 1999). In this Title VII
retaliation case, the court stated:
An adverse action occurs when an employee suffers some personal loss or
harm with respect to a term, condition, or privilege of employment. Mr.
Hoffman’s proposed transfer cannot be said to have caused him personal loss
or harm, or disadvantage him in any way cognizable under Title VII. His
rank, pay, and other benefits would not be changed. We acknowledge
plaintiff’s contention that personnel and conditions in the Chicago office
would be hostile to him. Such considerations, while hardly negligible on a
personal level, are not concrete enough to trigger a Title VII claim.
Id.
72. The Montandon and Hoffman decisions make no distinction between an adverse
employment action in cases alleging discrimination and those cases claiming retaliatory
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73

Stangler, the Eighth Circuit stated the rationale for these decisions by
quoting a decision of the Seventh Circuit: “A transfer involving only
minor changes in working conditions and no reduction in pay or benefits
will not constitute an adverse employment action, ‘otherwise every
trivial personnel action that an irritable . . . employee did not like would
74
form the basis of a discrimination suit.’ ”
There are exceptions, but they involve cases in which rather
extraordinary action was taken, albeit short of termination or a reduction
in pay. Recently, in an ADA case, the Eighth Circuit noted that the
adverse action “need not always involve termination or even a decrease
75
In that case, the court held that transfer of a
in benefits or pay.”
surgical nurse to a clerical position in which she could not exercise her
professional skill and worked in a room called the “dummy room”
76
amounted to an adverse employment action.
The limited number of
Minnesota appellate court decisions on these issues often cite Eighth
Circuit decisions, although the application of those standards may be less
77
stringent.
78
The MHRA, the ADA, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act all

action.
73. 122 F.3d 1142 (8th Cir. 1997).
74. Id. at 1144 (quoting Williams v. Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270, 274
(7th Cir. 1966)).
75. Brown, 286 F.3d at 1045 (citing Phillips v. Collings, 256 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir.
2001) (an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 charging discrimination and harassment on a
religious basis)). The court found that a fifty-three-page evaluation complete with
corrective action plans and remedial training requirements was, in the context presented,
an adverse employment action. Id.
76. Brown, 286 F.3d at 1045-46.
77. Dietrich v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., 536 N.W.2d 319 (Minn. 1995) is the only
reported state appellate decision that addresses what constitutes an adverse employment
action for purposes of a claim of discrimination under the Minnesota Human Rights Act.
Not surprisingly, the court stated that “[i]t would defy logic to hold that a plaintiff who is
unemployed because she is furloughed following a reduction-in-force has not suffered an
adverse employment action for purposes of a proceeding under the MHRA.” Id. at 325.
In Cierzan v. Hamline University, No. C4-02-706, 2002 WL 31553931, at *2 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2002), the court applied the “materially alters the terms or conditions of
employment” test in a case that arises under the MHRA. In Mahazu v. Becklund Home
Health Care, Inc., No. C8-02-28, 2002 WL 1751280, at * 4-*5 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002),
the court applied the “material employment disadvantage” test in a whistleblower action
under Minnesota Statutes section 181.932. In another whistleblower action, Johnson v.
Independent School District No. 118, No. CX-00-1998, 2001 WL 605081, at * 4 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2001), the court found that the proposed transfer of a bus aide from one school
bus to another was not an adverse employment action. Id. (citing Hoffman v. Rubin, 193
F.3d 959, 964 (8th Cir. 1999)).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2003).
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proscribe discrimination in a broad range of employment actions,
including discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment. Contrary to the decisions cited above, the United States
Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that this language in Title VII is not
limited to “economic” or “tangible” discrimination, and that it covers
79
more than “ ‘terms’ and ‘conditions’ in the narrow contractual sense.”
That Court has stated that Title VII demonstrates the intention of
80
Congress to define discrimination in the broadest possible terms. But
these statements were made in cases where the workplace was permeated
with pervasive discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that
81
created an abusive working environment.
The law clerk in this case was not faced with a hostile work
environment in these terms. Even if prohibited from being in the
courtroom for a trial, he would still be employed, would suffer no
diminution of pay or benefits, and would still use his professional skills.
From that standpoint, there would be no adverse employment action,
although the experience of being in court is, in many respects, one of the
important benefits of a law clerk position. Perhaps the case would be
different if similar motions were granted in other personal injury cases
during the course of the clerk’s tenure. Considered alone, however, one
order that prohibits a law clerk with a disability from being present in the
courtroom during one case, even if explicitly based upon that law clerk’s
disability, may not constitute an adverse employment action for purposes
of a lawsuit based on the MHRA or ADA.
B. Would There Be Justification for the Discriminatory Action?
The ADA provides a defense to employers who use selection
criteria that tend to screen out or deny a job or a benefit of a job to a
person with a disability—that those criteria are “job-related and
82
consistent with business necessity.” Assuming that an order or ruling
prohibiting a law clerk with a disability were challenged in an action
under the ADA, the defense could be that the very presence of a law
clerk with a severe disability in the courtroom would so prejudice the
jury that the plaintiff could not get a fair trial. This argument amounts to
a claim that, for some personal injury trials, it is a bona fide occupational

79.
80.
81.
82.

Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998).
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 116 (2002).
See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993).
42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (2003).
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qualification (“BFOQ”) that law clerks not have a disability, or at least a
visible one. But the validity of this BFOQ can “only be ascertained
83
when it is assessed in relationship to the business of the employer.” A
primary purpose of the court system is to offer litigants a fair trial.
Whether there is a reasonable basis to state that the law clerk’s presence
actually threatens the plaintiff’s right to a fair trial requires more detailed
consideration if obviously injured plaintiffs have been excluded from the
courtroom.
III. THE INTERESTS AND RIGHTS OF THE INJURED PLAINTIFF
A. The Plaintiff’s Interest and Right Is to Have a Fair Trial
The plaintiff in this case had disabilities that were significant, but
84
less severe than those of the court’s law clerk. He questioned whether
it was possible to get a fair assessment of his injuries when the jury
85
observed the law clerk working productively in the courtroom.
His
interest and his right is to a fair trial in which the jury would assess both
liability and his damages on the basis of the evidence presented. Unlike
the law clerk, his interests and rights at this juncture do not arise under
the ADA or the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of
86
disability in the MHRA. His claim is similar to the claim of defendants
83. Torres v. Wis. Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., 859 F.2d 1523, 1528 (7th Cir.
1988). In Torres the court had to determine whether the “business” of a women’s
maximum security prison was rehabilitation and to decide whether it was permissible to
employ only female correctional officers in that facility. Id. at 1524.
84. See Panel Case No. 15976, 653 N.W.2d 452, 454 (Minn. 2002) (noting plaintiff
was able to walk with a cane, whereas the law clerk was paralyzed from the mouth down
and used a wheelchair). Plaintiff sustained “serious permanent physical injuries that
disabled him when a school bus hit and ran over him with a rear tire while he was riding
a bicycle in South Minneapolis. Id. The accident crushed his pelvis, and left him in a
coma for approximately 1 month. By the time of trial, the [plaintiff] was able to walk
with the assistance of a cane.” Id.
85. Id. The plaintiff’s employment potential was limited not only by his injuries but
also by his employment background and experience:
Before the accident, the client was employed as a checker and bagger at a grocery
store and as a greeter at a restaurant. His employment background consisted of
similar unskilled and physical labor positions. At trial, the client asserted that his
permanent injuries prevented him from performing physical-labor-type jobs and
that he did not qualify educationally or intellectually for other types of
employment. Therefore, he sought damages for future loss of wages and future
diminished earning capacity.
Id.
86. The opinion of the court does not mention that the plaintiff was African-
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in personal injury actions who fear that the jury will be unfairly
sympathetic at the sight of a severely injured plaintiff. That claim, as
will be discussed below, has a due process basis. There are no reported
cases in which a litigant seeks to bar a court employee with a disability
from the courtroom to ensure a fair trial, but the principles established in
the cases in which the defendant seeks to exclude an injured plaintiff
from the courtroom provide a framework for discussion of the claim that
the law clerk’s presence reduced the likelihood that the plaintiff would
get a fair trial.
B. Basis in Law and Fact to Exclude Injured Plaintiffs from the
Courtroom During a Jury Trial
Some relatively early cases held that an injured plaintiff could not
be barred from any portion of a trial. The Eighth Circuit Court of
87
Appeals, in Chicago Great Western Railway Co. v. Beecher, held that a
plaintiff younger than 3 years old, whose injuries were not described,
could not be excluded from the courtroom during the trial. The trial
judge stated: “I know of no rule of law which authorizes the court to
88
exclude plaintiff, defendant, or any litigant from the courtroom.” The
Eighth Circuit acknowledged this lack of authority and summarily
89
dismissed a challenge to that ruling.
Similarly, the Florida Supreme Court rejected the argument that it
was an error for a trial judge to permit the plaintiff to be brought into the
courtroom on a stretcher in, according to the defendant, a “weak,
sickened and stupified [sic] condition and attended by a nurse and a
90
hospital attendant.” That court stated:
We think this point is wholly without merit. One who
institutes an action is entitled to be present when it is tried.
That, we think, is a right that should not be tempered by the
physical condition of the litigant. It would be strange, indeed,
to promulgate a rule that a plaintiff’s right to appear at his own
trial would depend on his personal attractiveness, or that he
could be excluded from the courtroom if he happened to be
American. Before the motion for a mistrial was made, the plaintiff expressed to his
counsel his concern that the jury and all the court officers were white. Transcript, Panel
Case No. 15976, 653 N.W.2d 452 (Minn. 2002) (Nos. C6-02-139 and C3-02-227) at 3941, Complainant’s Brief, supra note 36, at app. 66-68.
87. 150 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1945).
88. Id. at 399.
89. Id.
90. Fla. Greyhound Lines v. Jones, 60 So. 2d 396, 397 (Fla. 1952).
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unsightly from injuries which he was trying to prove the
91
defendant negligently caused.
The court added that if the use of the stretcher “affected” the trial, the
court could act to prevent the jury from being deceived by the
92
“subterfuge.” This analysis was approved in a New York decision that
reversed a trial court ruling that barred a plaintiff with paraplegia who
used a wheelchair from the courtroom while the jury was being
93
selected.
The court stated that “a judicial determination that the
physical appearance of a party, which he has not affected, may be the
basis for precluding such party from any stage of a trial, is fraught with
94
danger in its implications.”
A federal district judge in Louisiana denied a motion for a remittitur
of a $2 million verdict for an extremely badly burned child who was
95
present in the courtroom. The court stated:
The defendants suggest that the presence of the child in the
courtroom and in the corridors of the courthouse in some way
inflamed or prejudiced the jury. This allegation is unfounded;
the defendants have not pointed out any wrongful conduct on
the part of Helen Britain [the child], her parents, or counsel for
plaintiffs. Helen Britain was well behaved and quiet the entire
time she was in the courtroom. Accordingly I hold that there
was not any bias, prejudice, or any other improper influence
96
which motivated the jury in making its award.
Nothing in these reported decisions suggests that there was or had
been a request for a bifurcated trial of liability and damages issues.
Where damages, but not liability, are at issue, the courts uniformly allow
the plaintiff to be present in the courtroom. The courts follow differing
rules when a request is made to exclude an injured plaintiff from the
97
courtroom for the liability phase of a trial.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Carlisle v. Nassau County, 408 N.Y.S.2d 114, 118 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978),
appeal dismissed, 45 N.Y.2d 965 (1978).
94. Id.
95. Anderson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 377 F. Supp. 136, 141 (E.D. La. 1974).
96. Id.
97. Compare Dickson v. Bober, 269 Minn. 334, 337-38, 130 N.W.2d 526, 530
(1964) (holding that injured plaintiff had no right to be present when liability was
litigated because he could not contribute to or understand the proceeding and his rights
were protected by his legal guardian and his attorney) and Morley v. Super. Ct. of Ariz.,
638 P.2d 1331, 1334 (Ariz. 1981) (concluding that the comatose plaintiff was properly
precluded from appearing in front of the jury during the liability phase due to his inability
to assist in the presentation of his case) with Cary v. Oneok, Inc., 940 P.2d 201, 205
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In a leading case, the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that a plaintiff
who could neither contribute evidence on the question of fault nor
comprehend the proceedings had no right to be in the courtroom when
98
liability was litigated. Dickson v. Bober involved a young man injured
99
in a motorcycle accident. He was unable to express himself, helpless,
entirely dependent upon others, and wholly unable to comprehend the
100
trial proceedings.
The trial judge excluded him from the courtroom
after observing that “[h]is eyes seemed to function on detection of an
unusual movement,” that “[h]ideous and agonizing groans and sounds
emanated” from him, and that he would present a “depressing spectacle”
101
After a verdict for the defendant, the trial judge
before the jury.
ordered a new trial because the plaintiff was precluded from appearing
102
before the jury.
The court reversed, stating that “the determination of
whether a plaintiff unable by reason of his injuries to contribute to or
understand the trial proceedings should be permitted, nevertheless, to
103
attend the trial must rest in the sound discretion of the trial court.”
The court also suggested that to bifurcate the trial would allow a plaintiff
whose appearance is relevant to the issue of damages to be present for
104
that portion of the trial.
The Arizona Supreme Court adopted the Dickson analysis in Morley
105
v. Superior Court of Arizona, a case involving a comatose plaintiff.
The court stated:
A plaintiff unable to at least communicate with counsel will
have no right denied by exclusion from the courtroom during
the liability phase of the trial. If in addition the plaintiff’s
physical condition, allegedly caused by the defendant, is so
pitiable that the trial court determines the plaintiff’s mere
presence would prejudice the jury, then failure to exclude the
plaintiff during the liability phase would deny the defendant’s
right to an unbiased jury when the source of the bias is totally
(Okla. 1997) (holding physical appearance alone does not justify exclusion from the
courtroom) and Green v. N. Arundel Hosp. Ass’n, 785 A.2d 361, 364 (Md. 2001)
(excluding a severely brain damaged plaintiff from the liability phase of the trial because
of the prejudicial effect on the jury).
98. Dickson, 269 Minn. at 337-38, 130 N.W.2d at 530.
99. Id. at 336, 130 N.W.2d at 529.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 337, 130 N.W.2d at 530.
104. Id. at 337-38, 130 N.W.2d at 530.
105. 638 P.2d 1331 (Ariz. 1981).
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106

irrelevant to the liability issue.
The court added that bifurcation would permit the plaintiff to be
present during the damages portion of the trial and thus “prove damages
by the most direct evidence available—the plaintiff’s own physical
107
The Sixth Circuit reviewed these cases and provided an
condition.”
analytical framework, which has been followed in many subsequent
cases, to decide when an injured plaintiff should be excluded from the
108
109
courtroom.
Based on Carlisle v. Nassau County,
Florida
110
and Purvis v. Inter-County Telephone &
Greyhound Lines v. Jones,
111
the court held that a plaintiff’s physical condition
Telegraph Co.,
alone does not warrant exclusion from the courtroom during any phase of
112
the proceeding.
Based on Dickson, Morley, and the court’s conclusion
that any exclusion from the trial must be consistent with due process, the
court held that “a plaintiff who can comprehend the proceedings and aid
counsel may not be excluded from any portion of the proceedings absent
113
disruptive behavior or a knowing and voluntary waiver.”
The court held that, while jury sympathy alone would not establish
jury prejudice, “there may be occasions when the mere presence of a
party would render the jury unable to arrive at an unbiased judgment
114
concerning liability.”
The court based this holding on the fundamental
principle that the court has an obligation to ensure that a case is decided
on the evidence presented rather than emotional factors.115 To resolve
that issue, Helminski held that there must be a hearing in which the
defendant has the burden to establish that the plaintiff’s presence would
116
prevent or impair the jury’s performance of its fact-finding task.
The
106. Id. at 1334.
107. Id.
108. Helminski v. Ayerst Labs., 766 F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1985). Helminski was a
products liability case brought by parents on behalf of their minor son, Hugh, claiming
that he was harmed by in utero exposure to a surgical anesthetic while his mother worked
as a registered nurse anesthetist. Hugh was 17 years old when the case was tried. The
case was bifurcated late in the proceedings when plaintiff’s counsel indicated that he was
going to call Hugh as a witness. Id.
109. 408 N.Y.S.2d 114, 118 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978).
110. 60 So. 2d 396, 397 (Fla. 1952).
111. 203 So. 2d 508 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967), cert. denied, 210 So. 2d 223 (Fla.
1968) (noting that Greyhound Lines precludes the exclusion of the plaintiff from
courtroom on the basis of physical appearance).
112. Helminski, 766 F.2d at 215.
113. Id. at 216-17.
114. Id at 217.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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court cautioned, again, that physical appearance alone is not the test,
rather “the requisite showing of prejudice cannot be satisfied simply by
establishing that a plaintiff has a physical or mental injury; the party
seeking exclusion must establish that the party’s appearance or conduct
117
is likely to prevent the jury from performing its duty.”
If the court
decides that the party’s mere presence would be prejudicial, then the
court must consider whether “the party can comprehend the proceedings
118
and assist counsel in any meaningful way.”
If so, regardless of
119
prejudicial impact, the party cannot be involuntarily excluded.
The
Sixth Circuit held that the district court improperly excluded the 17-yearold plaintiff, whose physical appearance was normal, without observing
120
him, but on the basis of his described condition alone:
Although testimony indicated that Hugh was not toilet trained,
could not speak, comprehend the proceedings, or assist
counsel, and sometimes emitted frightening sounds, this
description is insufficient to establish that the jury would be
prevented from or substantially impaired in performing its
duty. The analysis absent in this case would focus on the
likelihood of Hugh displaying abnormal behavior and the
likelihood of this conduct affecting the jury’s ability to decide
121
the case on the facts.
The court does not specify how a display of abnormal behavior would
122
affect the jury’s ability to decide the case on the facts.
Several months before Helminski was decided, the company that
produced a drug that allegedly caused birth defects moved the federal
court in the Southern District of Ohio to exclude injured children from
123
the courtroom during the trial of causation issues.
The court ordered
that “no child under the age of 10 and no child with visible birth defects,
117. Id. at 218.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. The trial was not bifurcated until after the testimony of the plaintiff’s final
witness when plaintiff’s counsel announced his intention to call Hugh as his witness. See
id. at 212. His mother and brother had described him in their testimony. See id. at 21213.
121. Id. at 218. Although the record did not establish a basis to say that Hugh’s
presence at trial on the liability issue would be prejudicial, the court held that his absence
was not reversible error because Hugh was completely unable to comprehend the
proceedings or assist counsel in the case. See id.
122. Id.
123. See In re Richardson-Merril, Inc. “Bendectin” Prods. Liab. Litig., 624 F. Supp.
1212, 1222-24 (S.D. Ohio 1985), aff’d sub nom. In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290,
322-23 (6th Cir. 1988) (involving a total of 818 cases).
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regardless of age” would be permitted in the courtroom.
In support of
that order, the court stated that the children would not be able to
understand the expert testimony, that display of the children’s birth
defects was “irrelevant to the issue of causation,” and that large numbers
of children in the courtroom “present a serious potential for distraction
125
and disruption.”
A separate courtroom was to be set aside in which
children and adults (presumably their parents) could watch proceedings
126
After a verdict for the defendant on
on closed-circuit television.
liability, the court applied the Helminski analysis in denying a motion for
127
a new trial.
With regard to the first issue—whether prejudice was
established—the court stated:
It is clear that the presence at trial during the liability phase of
children suffering from severe visible birth defects is
inherently prejudicial. There is no more protected and beloved
member of human society than a helpless newborn infant.
Conversely, it has become fashionable to castigate and punish
that depersonalized segment of society identified variously as
“big business,” “soulless corporations,” or “industrial
complex.” If the battle is emotional alone, between newborn
infants and big business, there can be but one winner.
Emotional battles, however, should not be staged in the federal
courtroom. We deal in liability imposed not by emotion but by
law. It is customary, in fact, to instruct juries that “[a]ll
persons including corporations are entitled to a fair trial. The
128
law is no respector of persons.”
The court concluded that the “unfair prejudicial effect” of the presence of
a deformed child in the courtroom on trial of the liability issue was
129
“beyond calculation.”
The Bendectin case, which involved hundreds of children, was
atypical. Most cases involve a single plaintiff, often a child. In these
cases, nevertheless, courts often find the requisite prejudice to bar the
plaintiff from the courtroom. In a North Dakota case on behalf of a child
alleged to have suffered brain injury at birth, the court held that it was
not an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to exclude the child from the
courtroom during the liability phase of the trial because her “pathetic”
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

In re Richardson-Merril, Inc., 624 F. Supp. at 1271 (Appendix E).
Id. at 1270.
Id. at 1271.
Id. at 1249.
Id. at 1224 (quoting Appendix D at 1266).
Id.
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130

appearance would be a “distraction.”
In a similar case in Oregon, the
trial court refused to allow the jury to view the plaintiff child for a brief
period during the liability phase of the trial because the child could not
meaningfully participate in the trial and the sole reason would be to
131
prejudice the jury.
No formal hearing was held, but the Oregon
Supreme Court stated that detailed testimony about the child’s condition,
including the fact that he experienced eight to twelve seizures a day, and
the allegations in the complaint that he had mental retardation and spastic
quadriplegia provided ample basis for the trial court to determine that his
presence in the courtroom might have caused the jury to decide liability
132
on an improper, emotional basis.
The 20-year-old plaintiff in Green v.
133
North Arundel Hospital Ass’n, Inc.,
who had been severely brain134
was excluded from the liability
damaged almost a decade earlier,
135
The trial judge watched a videotape of the young
phase of the trial.
man’s day, which showed that he was virtually motionless except for
some eye blinking and some movement during suctioning or changing
136
his feeding tube.
The trial judge recognized that this man could not be
excluded from the courtroom solely on the basis of his physical
appearance, but found that the burden to justify his exclusion from the
liability phase of the trial had been met and that the prejudice from his
presence would extend beyond “any instructions that could be
137
offered.”
The cases just discussed strongly suggest that prejudice was actually
138
presumed from the physical appearance of the plaintiffs.
They also
strongly suggest that the paramount concern was whether the plaintiffs
could understand the proceedings and provide any assistance to their
139
counsel.
If they could not, then the burden of showing prejudice was
relatively slight.
130. Reems v. St. Joseph’s Hosp. & Health Ctr., 536 N.W.2d 666, 668-69 (N.D.
1995).
131. Bremner v. Charles, 821 P.2d 1080, 1084, 1086 (Or. 1991).
132. Id. at 1086.
133. 785 A.2d 361 (Md. 2001).
134. Id. at 364-65.
135. Id. at 378.
136. Id. at 381.
137. Id. at 371.
138. See Green v. N. Arundel Hosp. Ass’n, Inc., 785 A.2d 361, 363. (Md. 2001);
Reems v. St. Joseph’s Hosp. and Health Ctr., 536 N.W.2d 666, 669 (N.D. 1995);
Bremner v. Charles, 821 P.2d 1080, 1086 (Or. 1991).
139. See Green, 785 A.2d at 363; Reems, 536 N.W.2d at 669; Bremner, 821 P.2d at
1086.
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The Oklahoma Supreme Court adheres more closely to the
principles that physical appearance alone cannot justify exclusion from
the courtroom and that the possibility of juror sympathy alone is not jury
140
prejudice.
The Oklahoma case involved a boy, 6 years old at the time
141
The trial
of trial, who was severely burned when he was 3 years old.
judge bifurcated the trial, and stated unequivocally that the child would
be excluded from the courtroom “because he’s scarred so badly I think it
142
would be unfairly prejudicial.”
The Oklahoma Supreme Court
disagreed. That court referred both to Article 2, Section 6 of the
Oklahoma Constitution, which states that the “courts of justice of the
State shall be open to every person,” and to the due process basis for the
143
Helminski decision.
Although the court found no absolute right for a
party to be present in the courtroom, the court held that “[a] party’s
physical appearance cannot be the sole basis for exclusion from the
courtroom, and does not amount to an ‘extreme circumstance’ permitting
144
exclusion.”
The court also concluded that a child his age would likely
have “some understanding of the basic events of the trial as they occur,
145
and there is nothing in the record to the contrary.”
This court clearly
rejected the assumption that jury sympathy is the equivalent of prejudice:
“Rather than assuming the jury will be prejudiced by a physically scarred
plaintiff, this holding aligns us with those courts which repose trust in the
146
jury.”
Indiana likewise now requires either waiver or a showing of
“extraordinary circumstances” to justify exclusion of a party from the
147
courtroom, including the liability phase of a trial.
The Jordan court
based this holding on the state constitutional right to a jury trial in civil
148
cases.
The court held that the Helminski test announced in Gage v.
149
Bozarth was not sufficient to overcome the plaintiff’s right to attend
140. Cary v. Oneok, Inc., 940 P.2d 201, 204 (Okla. 1997).
141. Id. at 202.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 203 (citing Helminski v. Alyerst Labs., 766 F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1985)).
144. Id. at 204.
145. Id. at 205.
146. Id. Four members of the court dissented. Justice Opala stated, citing the
Bendectin case quoted supra, that in “every trial in which corporate defendants stand
pitted against children, the jury might easily be swayed in favor of an underage person
whose countenance is so seriously disfigured.” Id. at 214 (Opala, J., dissenting).
147. Jordan ex rel Jordan v. Deery, 778 N.E.2d 1264, 1272 (Ind. 2002).
148. Id. (citing IND. CONST. Art. I, § 20).
149. 505 N.E.2d 64, 69 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987), overruled by Jordan ex rel Jordan v.
Deery, 778 N.E.2d 1264 (Ind. 2002) (finding consistent with Helminski, that the plaintiff,
who is confined to a wheelchair and dependent upon a ventilator, was unable to
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150

her own trial.
The court refused “to articulate a ‘bright-line rule’ to
151
The dissent
determine what are ‘extraordinary circumstances.’ ”
observed, “if this case does not present extraordinary circumstances,
except for incarcerated litigants it seems that no circumstances could
152
meet this test.”
According to the court, the record shows:
Shelamiah suffers from cerebral palsy in all four extremities
and Erb’s palsy in the left arm, cannot talk, makes involuntary
movements and sounds, is sight impaired, and walks with the
use of braces and a walker . . . . There is a dispute as to
whether Shelamiah can understand the proceedings and
communicate with counsel with the use of a laptop
153
computer.
This plaintiff, 11 years old at the time of the trial, appears to be quite
similar to the plaintiffs in other cases discussed above. The difference,
according to the court, is that she would be denied what the court found
to be a “basic and fundamental” right to be present throughout the
154
trial.
These plaintiff exclusion cases establish at least three principles
relevant to the case of a law clerk with a disability. The first principle is
that the burden is on the party claiming prejudice to establish the bases
155
for excluding a person with a disability from the courtroom.
The
second principle is that the plaintiff is entitled to be present if there is a
156
There may be disagreement whether
constitutional right to do so.
there is an applicable constitutional right. There appears to be no
disagreement that if there is such a right, that right prevails even if the
plaintiff’s presence might have a substantial impact on a liability issue
157
for which the plaintiff’s physical condition or appearance is irrelevant.
The third principle relates to the second principle. Dickson, Morley,
understand the proceedings and to assist counsel).
150. Jordan, 778 N.E.2d at 1266.
151. Id. at 1272 n.8.
152. Id. at 1272 (Boehm, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 1266 n.3.
154. Id. at 1272.
155. Helminski v. Alyerst Labs., 766 F.2d 208, 217 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that a
plaintiff who could assist counsel had a due process right to be present during the liability
phase of a trial).
156. Id. at 218; Cary v. Oneok, 940 P.2d 201, 213-13 (Okla. 1997) (holding based on
both an Oklahoma state constitutional right and on due process); see also Jordan, 778
N.E.2d at 1272 (clearly finding that the state constitutional right to a jury trial tips the
balance in favor of the plaintiff’s presence in court).
157. See, e.g., Jordan, 778 N.E.2d at 1276 (finding the constitutional right to be
present overcomes potential prejudice).
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Helminski, and all of the subsequent cases agree that a plaintiff who can
assist counsel is entitled to be in court throughout the liability phase of a
trial even if the plaintiff’s appearance would otherwise be deemed
158
unfairly prejudicial.
In short, if the plaintiff has some purpose or
159
function to fulfill during the trial, the plaintiff cannot be excluded.
Ironically, if the law clerk in this case were the plaintiff in a personal
injury action, this principle establishes that he would be entitled to
remain in the courtroom throughout the trial.
IV. THE OBLIGATION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE TO PROTECT
THE INTERESTS OF BOTH THE LAW CLERK WITH A DISABILITY
AND THE INJURED PLAINTIFF
The trial judge, faced with a motion to exclude his law clerk from
the courtroom because of that law clerk’s disability, has obligations that
parallel the rights and interests of both the law clerk and the plaintiff.
The very purpose of a trial is to ensure that both parties receive a fair
hearing. The rules governing civil litigation state at the outset that the
160
purpose is to ensure a fair process that leads to a just determination.
One essential component of a fair trial is “a jury capable and willing to
161
decide the case solely on the evidence before it.”
The court must
protect that interest of both parties.
The court also has an obligation to protect the interest of the law
clerk that he is not discriminated against on the basis of disability. That
obligation arises, in part, from the very basic standards in the Code of
Judicial Conduct that a judge must “respect and comply with the law”
162
and “be faithful to the law . . . .”
This obligation should apply to
actions that regard court employees as well as to litigants before the
court. The public as a whole, as well as the law clerk with a disability,
158. Allen P. Grunes, Exclusion of Plaintiffs from the Courtroom in Personal Injury
Actions: A Matter of Discretion or Constitutional Right? 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 387,
397 (1998). Grunes identified several functions the plaintiff could serve during the trial
including an educative role (informing counsel of salient facts or issues), a strategic role
(discussing tactics with counsel), and what he termed a moral role (deterring untruthful
testimony by the opposing party). Id.
159. Id.
160. MINN. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules . . . shall be construed and administered to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.”); MINN. R. EVID.
102 (“These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration . . . to the end
that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.”).
161. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 554, (1984)
(quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982)).
162. MINN. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, Canons 2A and 3A(2) (2002).
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can reasonably expect that judges will comply with state and federal laws
that prohibit discrimination on all the bases specified in those statutes.
Beyond an obligation to comply with the law in general, however,
both the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Minnesota Rules of Practice
prohibit discriminatory actions by trial judges. Canon 3A(5) requires a
163
judge to “perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice.”
That
Canon states:
A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by
words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice, including but not
limited to bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion,
national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or
socioeconomic status, and shall not permit court personnel and
164
others subject to the judge’s direction and control to do so.
A judge who may not permit his law clerk to exhibit bias or prejudice
should not discriminate against that law clerk on the basis of disability.
Canon 3A(6) addresses the issue in terms applicable to the motion for a
mistrial, but begs the answer to the question:
A judge shall require lawyers in proceedings before the judge
to refrain from manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or
prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin,
disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, in
relation to parties, witnesses, counsel or others. This Section
3A(6) does not preclude legitimate advocacy when race, sex,
religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or
socioeconomic status, or other similar factors, are issues in the
165
proceeding.
The Minnesota General Rules of Practice for the district courts include
similar requirements for both the court and counsel. Rule 2.02(a)
includes this requirement, “[t]he judge shall at all times treat all lawyers,
jury members, and witnesses fairly and shall not discriminate on the
basis of race, color, creed, religion, national origin, sex, marital status,
sexual preference, status with regard to public assistance, disability, or
166
age.
Rule 2.03(d) includes a similar standard of conduct for
167
attorneys.
163. Id. at Canon 3A(5).
164. Id.
165. Id. at Canon 3A(6).
166. MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 2.02(a).
167. MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 2.03(d). The rule reads:
Lawyers shall treat all parties, participants, other lawyers, and court
personnel fairly and shall not discriminate on the basis of race, color, creed,
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The court’s obligation in this apparent conflict of interest between
168
Both the
the plaintiff and the law clerk is to be “faithful to the law.”
law clerk and the injured plaintiff ordinarily have a right to be in the
courtroom, the plaintiff to attend the trial of his case and the law clerk to
do his job. The cases discussed above state that an injured plaintiff
should not be excluded from the liability portion of a trial on the basis of
appearance alone. Similarly, the law clerk should not be excluded from
the courtroom on the basis of his evident disabilities unless there is some
additional basis to establish prejudice to the plaintiff.
The cases discussed above require that a defendant who seeks to bar
a plaintiff from the liability phase of a trial has the burden of showing
that it would be unfair or prejudicial to allow the injured plaintiff in the
courtroom. How prejudice is established is not clearly explained. Two
suggested bases for establishing prejudice are that the plaintiffs will
169
distract the jury either by their appearance or by their behavior, or that
the plaintiff’s appearance will prompt an emotional response by the jury
170
In this case, even
rather than a rational consideration of the evidence.
if some members of the jury feel sympathetic to the law clerk, there is no
reason that this sympathy would prejudice the jury against the plaintiff to
the extent that observation of children with birth defects might prejudice
a drug company. It is speculative to suggest that jurors will grant less
damages to an injured plaintiff because there is somebody with manifest
disabilities working in the courtroom. Indeed, the speculation could run
religion, national origin, sex, marital status, sexual preference, status with
regard to public assistance, disability or age.
Id.
168. MINN. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 3A(2) (2002).
169. Morley v. Super. Ct. of Ariz., 638 P. 2d 1331,1334 (Ariz. 1981) (stating that
even during the damages phase of the trial the plaintiff might be kept out of the
courtroom if his “presence becomes disruptive to the conduct of the trial”); Green v. N.
Arundel Hosp. Ass’n, Inc., 785 A.2d 361, 370 n.4. (Md. 2001) (noting that the trial court
might have been concerned with “the disruptive effect of suctioning his air tube—the
noise and jerking movement that the court observed on the video”).
170. In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc., “Bendectin” Prods. Liab. Litig., 624 F. Supp.
1212, 1222-23 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (“Trial attorneys do not seek an impartial jury. They
seek a sympathetic jury.”); Bremner v. Charles, 821 P.2d 1080, 1086 (Or. 1991)
(“[Plaintiff’s] presence in the courtroom during the liability phase of the bifurcated trial
may have caused the jury to decide the question of liability on an improper basis, i.e. an
emotional one.”); Morley, 638 P.2d at 1333 (“[H]is presence would only prejudice the
jury by evoking sympathy for him.”); Caputo v. Joseph J. Sarcona Trucking Co., Inc.,
611 N.Y.S.2d 655, 655 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (“[plaintiff’s] presence in the courtroom
would have impaired the jury’s ability to objectively perform its task because he
physically appeared to be in a state of unawareness”).
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the other way.
Even if there were some rational basis for the claim that the jury
members will be swayed to the detriment of the plaintiff’s damages
award by the law clerk’s presence, the cases discussed above hold that
the injured plaintiff may not be excluded from the courtroom so long as
he or she serves some purpose in the courtroom, including the ability to
confer with counsel. The law clerk, who serves several functions in the
courtroom, should likewise not be excluded. The law clerk also has a
right under state and federal law to work in a courtroom setting if
qualified to do so. Just as the injured plaintiff’s due process rights (or
state constitutional rights) should not be abridged because the jury might
be swayed by the plaintiff’s appearance, the law clerk’s rights under the
MHRA and the ADA should not be abridged on the speculative basis that
the jury will disobey instructions to decide the case, including damages,
upon the basis of the evidence presented.
The employment discrimination cases discussed above indicate that
an isolated instance in which a law clerk is prevented from working in
the courtroom because of that law clerk’s disability may not constitute an
actionable adverse employment action under either the MHRA or the
ADA. If such a case were presented, hopefully the courts would not
characterize a deliberately discriminatory action taken in a court of law
as a “mere inconvenience” or dismiss that action as another example of a
personnel action that makes an irritable employee unhappy. The issue is
171
not whether the employer was evenhanded in allocating computers.
The mistrial motion in this case sought deliberate discrimination by the
presiding officer in a court of law. If in fact it was the intent of Congress
to define discrimination in the broadest possible terms, and the language
of both Title VII and the ADA does that, then an order or ruling that
excludes a court employee from the courtroom simply because that
employee had an evident disability should be an actionable adverse
employment action.
Whether or not the law clerk has a viable action under the ADA or
the MHRA, that order or ruling would be inconsistent with the Code of
Judicial Conduct and, in Minnesota, the Rules of Practice in the district
172
courts.
Those standards reflect what the courts ought to be—places
where discrimination against members of protected classes does not
occur. That point was made in two decisions of the United States

171.
172.

See Enowmbitang v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 148 F.3d 970, 973 (8th Cir. 1998).
CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT 2A and 3A(2); MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 202(a) and 203(d).
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173

Supreme Court in cases involving the use of peremptory challenges.
In Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., the Court held that private
litigants may not use peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on the
174
basis of race.
The Court concluded that use of peremptory challenges
on the basis of race could require potential jurors “to be put at risk of
open and public discrimination as a condition of their participation in the
175
justice system.”
Justice Kennedy added:
Finally, we note that the injury caused by the discrimination is
made more severe because the government permits it to occur
within the courthouse itself. Few places are a more real
expression of the constitutional authority of the government
than a courtroom, where the law itself unfolds. Within the
courtroom, the government invokes its laws to determine the
rights of those who stand before it. In full view of the public,
litigants press their cases, witnesses give testimony, juries
render verdicts, and judges act with the utmost care to ensure
176
that justice is done.
Three years later the Court held that intentional discrimination on
the basis of gender in the use of peremptory strikes also violated the
177
Once again the Court noted the impact of
Equal Protection Clause.
this action on the integrity of the judicial system:
Equal opportunity to participate in the fair administration of
justice is fundamental to our democratic system. It not only
furthers the goals of the jury system. It reaffirms the promise
of equality under the law—that all citizens, regardless of race,
ethnicity, or gender, have the chance to take part directly in our
democracy. When persons are excluded from participation in
our democratic processes solely because of race or gender, this
promise of equality dims, and the integrity of our judicial
178
system is jeopardized.
179
Although the Court made no reference to disability in this statement,
173. Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628-30 (1991); J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex rel T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 145-48 (1994).
174. Edmondson, 500 U.S. at 618-19.
175. Id. at 628.
176. Id.
177. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 130-31.
178. Id. at 145-46 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
179. It is highly improbable that the Court will extend these rulings to exclude
peremptory strikes based on disability. At an early point in the opinion, the Court stated
that litigants may “exercise their peremptory challenges to remove from the venire any
group or class of individuals normally subject to ‘rational basis’ review.” Id. at 143. The
Court cited Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985), which held
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there is no reason to say that discrimination on the basis of disability is
ever acceptable in our courts.
The Minnesota Supreme Court was right. The court employee with
a disability did have a right to perform his job in the courtroom and the
180
motion for a mistrial based on his presence was indeed inappropriate.
The court was also right to state that “[n]either race nor disability should
181
be used as a means of limiting participation in our courts.”
The court
failed, however, to characterize discrimination on the basis of disability
as “inherently serious.” The court could have stated forcefully, but did
not, that when discrimination on the basis of disability occurs within the
courtroom, the promise of equality dims within the courtroom and, in the
instance of this case, in the legal profession.
V. CONCLUSION
In 1993, in Panel File 98-26, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted
that its Task Force on Racial Bias in the Judicial System recognized that
the justice system found itself “used as a powerful tool of the pervasive
prejudice and the subtle, often elaborately camouflaged discrimination
182
that still deeply scars our national life.”
In 2003, a decade after that
task force report, the number of African-American partners at the largest
law firms in Minneapolis and St. Paul could “be counted on two hands, a
183
situation almost unchanged from a decade ago.”
The legal profession
has had and still has an “inherently serious” problem in the employment
184
of African-Americans.
that a rational basis test, not a strict scrutiny test, applies to determine whether a
particular action that affects a person because that person has a disability violates the
Equal Protection Clause. There is no reasonable likelihood that this ruling will be
changed. In any event, in many cases potential jurors with disabilities might be excluded
for cause.
180. See Panel Case No. 15976, 653 N.W.2d 452 (Minn. 2002).
181. Id. at 456.
182. Panel File 98-26, 597 N.W.2d 563, 567 (Minn. 1999) (quoting MINNESOTA
SUPREME COURT, TASK FORCE ON RACIAL BIAS IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM, FINAL REPORT 5
(1993)).
183. Deborah Caulfield, Limited Partnerships, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Feb. 9,
2003, at D1.
184. This article cannot encompass a complete discussion of all issues relating to
discrimination in the legal profession. Gender discrimination continues as well. While
women associates are being hired at roughly the same rate as men, the great majority of
partners in private firms are male and male attorneys are more highly compensated than
women. WOMEN IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION COMMITTEE, MINNESOTA STATE BAR
ASSOCIATION, SELF-AUDIT FOR GENDER EQUITY (SAGE): SURVEY OF PRIVATE LAW FIRMS
1995-2000, at Conclusion (Oct. 22, 2002).
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The legal profession has had and still has a serious problem in
hiring and employment of persons with disabilities. In 1999, the
Disability Subcommittee of the Hennepin County Bar Association
Diversity Committee issued a Report and Model Guidelines for the
Integration of Attorneys and Law Students with Disabilities into the
Legal Profession. The subcommittee concluded “that people with
disabilities have been discriminatorily excluded from full participation in
185
the legal profession.”
The subcommittee based this conclusion in part
on nationwide surveys that consistently showed “that attorneys with
disabilities, despite their qualifications, are greatly disadvantaged in the
job market, and that their starting salaries are lower than those of their
186
non-disabled colleagues statewide.”
The subcommittee also quoted
187
One respondent
local attorneys who reported discrimination in hiring.
to a survey conducted by the subcommittee stated: “Once my disability
was revealed, the tone of the interview changed dramatically from
188
friendly to suspicious of me.”
Nationwide survey data confirm the experience of attorneys with
disabilities in Hennepin County and throughout Minnesota. The
National Association for Law Placement surveys law graduates and
reports on their employment status and salaries. These surveys establish
that only a small number of law graduates report they have a disability.189
From 2000 to 2002, the percentage of law graduates with a disability
employed in full-time legal work, or work for which bar passage was
required, has ranged from 13% to 18% lower than the percentage for all
190
law graduates.
For all types of work, the percentage of graduates who
have a disability who are employed has been 8% less than the percentage
of all graduates.191 Median starting salaries reported by law graduates

185. DIVERSITY COMMITTEE DISABILITY SUBCOMMITTEE, HENNEPIN COUNTY BAR
ASSOCIATION, REPORT AND MODEL GUIDELINES FOR THE INTEGRATION OF ATTORNEYS AND
LAW STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES INTO THE LEGAL PROFESSION 2 (May 1999)
[hereinafter REPORT AND GUIDELINES].
186. Id. at 4.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. For the classes of 2000, 2001, and 2002, “employment status” was reported as of
mid-February of the following year for 427, 387, and 411 law graduates with a disability,
respectively, out of a total of more than 30,000 graduates. NALP, Jobs & J.D.’s,
Employment and Salaries of New Law Graduates, Class of 2000, at 45; NALP, Jobs &
J.D.’s, Employment and Salaries of New Law Graduates, Class of 2001, at 45; NALP,
Jobs & J.D.’s, Employment and Salaries of New Law Graduates, Class of 2002, at 47.
190. Id.
191. Id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss2/4

30

Granquist: Unlawful Discrimination or a Necessity for a Fair Trial?: Exclusi
4 GRANQUIST - PAGINATED.DOC

2003]

12/8/2003 2:50 PM

FAIRNESS TO THE DISABLED OR THE PLAINTIFF?

485

with a disability remained static at $46,000 to $47,000 from 2000 to
2002, while median salaries for all graduates increased from $51,900 to
192
$60,000 during that period.
Discrimination on the basis of disability in our judicial system has
not received the scrutiny given to discrimination, also very real, on the
basis of race and gender. Despite the evident disparity between the rate
of employment and compensation of lawyers with disabilities and
lawyers who do not have disabilities, studies and reports on diversity in
the legal profession frequently do not focus on or even address
193
employment of lawyers with a disability.
The National Association
for Law Placement (“NALP”) and the American Bar Association
(“ABA”) recently undertook “a comprehensive study of judicial
194
clerkships as employment opportunities for law graduates.”
NALP
and the ABA were motivated by “several critical concerns about
195
clerkships and diversity in the legal profession.”
Nevertheless, the
word “disability” occurs only once in the “Executive Summary and
Action Plan,” in a statement that had nothing to do with students with
disabilities but rather discussed reasons students gave, or not, for seeking
196
a clerkship with a particular judge.
As might be expected in a report
motivated in part by concerns about diversity among law clerks, the
judiciary portion of the Action Plan included a recommendation that the
197
courts seek to employ a diverse group of law clerks.
The report states,
“[t]he judiciary is encouraged to join many other organizations who have
embraced the goal of diversity in background, experience, race, ethnicity,
192. Id. The number of law graduates with a disability reporting salary information
was small: only 213 for the class of 2000, 191 for the class of 2001, and 183 for the class
of 2002. NALP, Class of 2000, at 18, 60; NALP, Class of 2001, at 18, 58; NALP, Class
of 2002, at 18, 60.
193. The Hennepin County Bar Association’s report is an exception, as is the report
from the San Francisco Bar Association on which it builds. See REPORT AND
GUIDELINES, supra note 185, at 2 (focusing on integrating attorneys and law students with
disabilities into the legal profession); BASF, Guidelines for Accommodation of Lawyers
and Law Students with Disabilities, available at http://www.sfbar.org/about/
diversity.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2003) (also on file with the author). That
organization also produced videotape, Breaking Down Barriers: Overcoming
Discrimination Against Lawyers with Disabilities. Id.
194. NALP, Courting Clerkships: The NALP Judicial Clerkship Study, Introduction
and Rationale, at http://www.nalp.org/nalpresearch/clrksumm.htm (last visited Nov. 25,
2003).
195. Id.
196. Id. at Findings from the Law Students Study. The report states: “Considerably
de-emphasized by the students were factors such as a personal connection to the judge
and the race/ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation or disability status of the judge.” Id.
197. Id. at Action Plan to Address These Concerns: I. The Judiciary.
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gender, sexual orientation, and age for the legal profession by setting a
198
Perhaps it was merely an
similar goal for their clerkship ranks.”
oversight that “disability” was not included in this recommendation.
Perhaps it was not, for the data collected as part of this study do not
include references to whether law clerks have a disability. Table 1
199
provides “Demographic Characteristics” for the years 1994-98.
There
are data on Native Americans, Asian/Pacific Islanders, AfricanAmericans, Hispanics, Caucasians, and women, but no data on persons
200
with disabilities.
The other tables address race, ethnicity, and gender
201
distribution, but not issues relating to disability.
In Panel Case No. 15976, the Minnesota Supreme Court did not
ignore the mandate of state and federal law that discrimination on the
basis of disability can no longer be tolerated in our society, in the legal
system, and in the legal profession. Rather, the court found that conduct
involving discrimination on the basis of disability, when it involved a
potential conflict of the “perceived rights” of two persons with
disabilities, was less serious than the “inherently serious” discrimination
202
on the basis of race.
The rights in question are, as discussed above,
significantly different. The right to a fair trial is shared by all litigants,
whether persons with disabilities or not.
The right not to be
discriminated against on the basis of disability arises out of the status of
being a person with a disability and is unique to that group of persons.
In commentary on this case and the aftermath of it, the chair of the
Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board made these
statements:
Some experienced trial lawyers have argued that the conduct in
question should never have been a disciplinary matter in the
first place, citing the lawyer’s critical role as an advocate for
his client’s interests. There is certainly a strong intuitive sense,
especially among trial lawyers, that a lawyer should never be
subject to discipline for making an argument that he or she
203
reasonably believes to be in the client’s interests.
There is, not only among persons with disabilities, a strong intuitive
198. Id.
199. NALP, Courting Clerkships: The NALP Judicial Clerkship Study, Table 1. Law
School Classes 1994-1998—Demographic Characteristics (on file with the author).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Panel Case No. 15976, 653 N.W.2d 452, 458 (Minn. 2002).
203. Charles E. Lundberg, Making Private Discipline a Public Matter, BENCH & BAR
OF MINN. 12, 13 (Feb. 2003).
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sense that few lawyers would have considered making a comparable
motion based on the race or sex of a courtroom employee. The
peremptory strike cases stress that discrimination on the basis of race and
gender in jury selection harms the judicial system. Why should
discrimination on the basis of disability in the courtroom be any
different? The plaintiff exclusion cases discussed above provide part of
the reason. The plaintiffs are viewed, by both counsel and the courts, as
204
objects that present an injury or a disability.
Their right to be present
205
or not is considered, at least in part, under the Rules of Evidence.
In
the present case, the motion to have the law clerk barred from the
courtroom treated him as an object potentially in evidence. Plaintiffs
bring their “object status” to an action, but law clerks do not.
Today, the judicial system, broadly viewed to include bench and
bar, jurors, and court personnel, includes more persons of color and more
women than ever before. Issues of discrimination on the basis of race
and gender continue, but progress has been made. However, few persons
with evident disabilities practice law or sit on the bench. Perhaps that is
why the very presence of a man with serious disabilities prompts
concerns about the effect that he will have, just being there, on the
outcome of a case. When more persons with evident disabilities, more
persons who use wheelchairs or have personal care attendants or make
204. See, e.g., Green v. N. Arundel Hosp. Ass’n, Inc., 785 A.2d 361, 370 n.4 (Md.
2001) (“If, as we are now told, the intent was to have him brought in on one day for less
than an hour, the implication is even stronger that his presence would simply be as an
exhibit, not to implement his constitutional, statutory, or common law right to be
present.”). In a prosecution for criminal vehicular operation resulting in injury (“great
bodily harm”), the trial court allowed the severely injured victim, a young child, to be
present in the courtroom at the time a physician testified about his injuries. The
Minnesota Court of Appeals found no basis for reversal of the conviction:
At trial, all relevant evidence is admissible. If, however, the potential for
prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of a piece of evidence,
the trial court may exclude it. [The defendant] argues that the trial court
erred in allowing [the victim] to be present in the courtroom.
Although [the victim’s] appearance may have been shocking, it was not so
prejudicial as to forbid [his] presence. In addition, we note that [the victim]
was not admitted into evidence nor, as appellant admits in his brief, was [he]
used for any demonstrative purpose.
State v. VanWert, 438 N.W.2d 416, 423 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989), rev’d on other grounds,
442 N.W.2d 795 (Minn. 1989) (citations omitted).
205. See In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc., “Bendectin” Prods. Liab. Litig., 624 F.
Supp. 1212, 1224 (S.D. Ohio 1985); Reems v. St. Joseph’s Hosp. and Health Ctr., 536
N.W.2d 666, 668-69 (N.D. 1995) (stating that the trial court excluded a disabled plaintiff
from the courtroom under the North Dakota Rules of Evidence 403 because the
“pathetic” appearance of the plaintiff would be a “distraction”).
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notes in braille, are present in courthouses, practice law, or decide cases,
these concerns regarding the impact of a particular courtroom employee
should be alleviated. If more persons with disabilities were seen
practicing law or deciding cases, it is also probable that more
consideration would be given by the courts and by attorneys to the effect
that misguided advocacy may have on persons with disabilities.
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